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Inheritance powder is the name that was given to poisons, especially arsenic, 
that were commonly used in the 17th and early 18th centuries to hasten the 
death of the elderly. For most of the 17th century, arsenic was deadly but 
undetectable, making it nearly impossible to prove that someone had been 
poisoned. The first arsenic test produced a gas—hardly something that a 
scientist could show to a judge. Faced with a growing epidemic of poisonings, 
doctors and chemists spent decades searching for something better. 
James Marsh’s test for arsenic, published in 1836, ushered in a revolution in 
forensic toxicology. Unlike previous tests, the Marsh test detected not just the 
presence of arsenic, but could be used to determine the amount as well. The 
test was exceedingly sensitive. Most importantly, the test produced a stable 
black powder that could be both observed with the eye and preserved so that it 
could be shown to a jury at a later time. Poisonings continued, of course, but 
the chance of being caught increased dramatically.  
Today’s digital forensics has more than a passing resemblance to forensic 
toxicology. Instead of poisons, we have malware and hacker tools. Instead of 
the Marsh test and its modern replacement, gas chromatography, we have anti-
virus scanners and lists of hash values. But in many ways the goal is still the 
same. The forensic examiner scans for that which does not belong. Such 
materials, when found, can be evidence of foul play. 
There are, however, fundamental differences between human bodies and 
computer systems. Humans are live, natural objects, interacting moment-by-
moment with a complex environment. Bodies are filled with chemicals and 
viruses that are unknown and for which no test exists. There is no way to 
enumerate the state of a human being—let alone preserve or restore it! A 
forensic pathologist would never attempt to explain every cell, virus, and 
chemical that’s found in corpse. The task would be foolhardy for the simple 
reason that even healthy bodies are filled with stuff that has yet to be observed 
or identified, let alone explained. 
Computer systems, in contrast, are knowable. We can precisely capture the 
contents of a computer’s hard drive—even restore it on another system. (Try 
that with a human!) We can isolate a computer from its environment, or 
alternatively we can capture every piece of information that moves between a 
computer and the Internet. We can know the contents of every last byte. 
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Indeed, using record and reply technology (now standard on VMWare 
Workstation), it is possible to watch the same piece of malware executing again 
and again over the same piece of data. 
Instead of looking for the bad stuff, an alternative way to conduct a forensic 
examination might be to explain every last byte—or at least to try. 
Today’s digital forensic examiners lack both the tools and the training to 
explain every last byte of what’s on a hard drive. More importantly, they lack 
the science. Computer system may be enumerable, but even simple computers 
have an astounding number of enumerable states. This means that simplistic 
approaches to classifying the content of a computer system are bound to fail, 
for the simple reason that they are not sufficient to handle the computer’s 
inherent complexity. 
For example, many examiners today use the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) National Software Reference Library (NSRL) Reference 
Data Set (RDS) to scan for malware and hacker tools. This approach won’t find 
a computer that was hacked due to running an out-of-date copy of Adobe Flash 
for the simple reason that the vulnerable copy of Flash is in the RDS. The RDS 
won't identify it as “malware” because the program was previously published 
by Adobe, vulnerabilities and all. Likewise, hash-based approaches will never 
be able to find a computer hacked because of an unknown zero-day attack, or 
one that’s been compromised with custom-written malware. 
An alternative approach is to take the observable information and assemble it 
into a set of models that explain the computer’s history—and presumably, the 
user’s actions.  Distinguish data that fits the model from those that don’t. Bring 
inconsistencies to the attention of the forensic examiner. 
With a few years of research, this approach might be able to detect the presence 
of unknown steganography techniques in complex document types. The 
detector would have a model that describes how the bytes within a Microsoft 
Word, JPEG, or ZIP file are structured. The detector could then examine a 
corpus of documents and look for those that don’t follow the model—or for 
those that show unexpected variability in regions where other documents show 
consistency.  
Turing teaches us that we can’t really understand every last byte on a computer 
system, for the simple reason that many of those bytes are both programs and 
data. Still, much may be gained from automated tools designed to build an 
affirmative model of what is known, rather than tools that search out evidence 
of malfeasance. After all, criminals have shown a remarkable ability to come 
up with new poisons. 
 
